[cron:d6762c54-737b-465f-9bbe-bc3fd5474dff Platform Health Council — Daily Check] Run platform health check
Current time: Saturday, March 7th, 2026 — 8:30 AM (UTC)

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The user is asking me to run a platform health check as part of a scheduled cron job. This is a heartbeat-style task from a cron scheduler.

Looking at my skills, I see there's a `healthcheck` skill that's relevant:
- **healthcheck**: "Host security hardening and risk-tolerance configuration for OpenClaw deployments. Use when a user asks for security audits, firewall/SSH/update hardening, risk posture, exposure review, OpenClaw cron scheduling for periodic checks, or version status checks on a machine running OpenClaw (laptop, workstation, Pi, VPS)."

This matches the request - a cron-scheduled platform health check on an OpenClaw deployment.

According to the skills section:
> Before replying: scan <available_skills> <description> entries.
> - If exactly one skill clearly applies: read its SKILL.md at <location> with `read`, then follow it.

The healthcheck skill is clearly applicable here. Let me read its SKILL.md file first.


---
name: healthcheck
description: Host security hardening and risk-tolerance configuration for OpenClaw deployments. Use when a user asks for security audits, firewall/SSH/update hardening, risk posture, exposure review, OpenClaw cron scheduling for periodic checks, or version status checks on a machine running OpenClaw (laptop, workstation, Pi, VPS).
---

# OpenClaw Host Hardening

## Overview

Assess and harden the host running OpenClaw, then align it to a user-defined risk tolerance without breaking access. Use OpenClaw security tooling as a first-class signal, but treat OS hardening as a separate, explicit set of steps.

## Core rules

- Recommend running this skill with a state-of-the-art model (e.g., Opus 4.5, GPT 5.2+). The agent should self-check the current model and suggest switching if below that level; do not block execution.
- Require explicit approval before any state-changing action.
- Do not modify remote access settings without confirming how the user connects.
- Prefer reversible, staged changes with a rollback plan.
- Never claim OpenClaw changes the host firewall, SSH, or OS updates; it does not.
- If role/identity is unknown, provide recommendations only.
- Formatting: every set of user choices must be numbered so the user can reply with a single digit.
- System-level backups are recommended; try to verify status.

## Workflow (follow in order)

### 0) Model self-check (non-blocking)

Before starting, check the current model. If it is below state-of-the-art (e.g., Opus 4.5, GPT 5.2+), recommend switching. Do not block execution.

### 1) Establish context (read-only)

Try to infer 1–5 from the environment before asking. Prefer simple, non-technical questions if you need confirmation.

Determine (in order):

1. OS and version (Linux/macOS/Windows), container vs host.
2. Privilege level (root/admin vs user).
3. Access path (local console, SSH, RDP, tailnet).
4. Network exposure (public IP, reverse proxy, tunnel).
5. OpenClaw gateway status and bind address.
6. Backup system and status (e.g., Time Machine, system images, snapshots).
7. Deployment context (local mac app, headless gateway host, remote gateway, container/CI).
8. Disk encryption status (FileVault/LUKS/BitLocker).
9. OS automatic security updates status.
   Note: these are not blocking items, but are highly recommended, especially if OpenClaw can access sensitive data.
10. Usage mode for a personal assistant with full access (local workstation vs headless/remote vs other).

First ask once for permission to run read-only checks. If granted, run them by default and only ask questions for items you cannot infer or verify. Do not ask for information already visible in runtime or command output. Keep the permission ask as a single sentence, and list follow-up info needed as an unordered list (not numbered) unless you are presenting selectable choices.

If you must ask, use non-technical prompts:

- “Are you using a Mac, Windows PC, or Linux?”
- “Are you logged in directly on the machine, or connecting from another computer?”
- “Is this machine reachable from the public internet, or only on your home/network?”
- “Do you have backups enabled (e.g., Time Machine), and are they current?”
- “Is disk encryption turned on (FileVault/BitLocker/LUKS)?”
- “Are automatic security updates enabled?”
- “How do you use this machine?”
  Examples:
  - Personal machine shared with the assistant
  - Dedicated local machine for the assistant
  - Dedicated remote machine/server accessed remotely (always on)
  - Something else?

Only ask for the risk profile after system context is known.

If the user grants read-only permission, run the OS-appropriate checks by default. If not, offer them (numbered). Examples:

1. OS: `uname -a`, `sw_vers`, `cat /etc/os-release`.
2. Listening ports:
   - Linux: `ss -ltnup` (or `ss -ltnp` if `-u` unsupported).
   - macOS: `lsof -nP -iTCP -sTCP:LISTEN`.
3. Firewall status:
   - Linux: `ufw status`, `firewall-cmd --state`, `nft list ruleset` (pick what is installed).
   - macOS: `/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate` and `pfctl -s info`.
4. Backups (macOS): `tmutil status` (if Time Machine is used).

### 2) Run OpenClaw security audits (read-only)

As part of the default read-only checks, run `openclaw security audit --deep`. Only offer alternatives if the user requests them:

1. `openclaw security audit` (faster, non-probing)
2. `openclaw security audit --json` (structured output)

Offer to apply OpenClaw safe defaults (numbered):

1. `openclaw security audit --fix`

Be explicit that `--fix` only tightens OpenClaw defaults and file permissions. It does not change host firewall, SSH, or OS update policies.

If browser control is enabled, recommend that 2FA be enabled on all important accounts, with hardware keys preferred and SMS not sufficient.

### 3) Check OpenClaw version/update status (read-only)

As part of the default read-only checks, run `openclaw update status`.

Report the current channel and whether an update is available.

### 4) Determine risk tolerance (after system context)

Ask the user to pick or confirm a risk posture and any required open services/ports (numbered choices below).
Do not pigeonhole into fixed profiles; if the user prefers, capture requirements instead of choosing a profile.
Offer suggested profiles as optional defaults (numbered). Note that most users pick Home/Workstation Balanced:

1. Home/Workstation Balanced (most common): firewall on with reasonable defaults, remote access restricted to LAN or tailnet.
2. VPS Hardened: deny-by-default inbound firewall, minimal open ports, key-only SSH, no root login, automatic security updates.
3. Developer Convenience: more local services allowed, explicit exposure warnings, still audited.
4. Custom: user-defined constraints (services, exposure, update cadence, access methods).

### 5) Produce a remediation plan

Provide a plan that includes:

- Target profile
- Current posture summary
- Gaps vs target
- Step-by-step remediation with exact commands
- Access-preservation strategy and rollback
- Risks and potential lockout scenarios
- Least-privilege notes (e.g., avoid admin usage, tighten ownership/permissions where safe)
- Credential hygiene notes (location of OpenClaw creds, prefer disk encryption)

Always show the plan before any changes.

### 6) Offer execution options

Offer one of these choices (numbered so users can reply with a single digit):

1. Do it for me (guided, step-by-step approvals)
2. Show plan only
3. Fix only critical issues
4. Export commands for later

### 7) Execute with confirmations

For each step:

- Show the exact command
- Explain impact and rollback
- Confirm access will remain available
- Stop on unexpected output and ask for guidance

### 8) Verify and report

Re-check:

- Firewall status
- Listening ports
- Remote access still works
- OpenClaw security audit (re-run)

Deliver a final posture report and note any deferred items.

## Required confirmations (always)

Require explicit approval for:

- Firewall rule changes
- Opening/closing ports
- SSH/RDP configuration changes
- Installing/removing packages
- Enabling/disabling services
- User/group modifications
- Scheduling tasks or startup persistence
- Update policy changes
- Access to sensitive files or credentials

If unsure, ask.

## Periodic checks

After OpenClaw install or first hardening pass, run at least one baseline audit and version check:

- `openclaw security audit`
- `openclaw security audit --deep`
- `openclaw update status`

Ongoing monitoring is recommended. Use the OpenClaw cron tool/CLI to schedule periodic audits (Gateway scheduler). Do not create scheduled tasks without explicit approval. Store outputs in a user-approved location and avoid secrets in logs.
When scheduling headless cron runs, include a note in the output that instructs the user to call `healthcheck` so issues can be fixed.

### Required prompt to schedule (always)

After any audit or hardening pass, explicitly offer scheduling and require a direct response. Use a short prompt like (numbered):

1. “Do you want me to schedule periodic audits (e.g., daily/weekly) via `openclaw cron add`?”

If the user says yes, ask for:

- cadence (daily/weekly), preferred time window, and output location
- whether to also schedule `openclaw update status`

Use a stable cron job name so updates are deterministic. Prefer exact names:

- `healthcheck:security-audit`
- `healthcheck:update-status`

Before creating, `openclaw cron list` and match on exact `name`. If found, `openclaw cron edit <id> ...`.
If not found, `openclaw cron add --name <name> ...`.

Also offer a periodic version check so the user can decide when to update (numbered):

1. `openclaw update status` (preferred for source checkouts and channels)
2. `npm view openclaw version` (published npm version)

## OpenClaw command accuracy

Use only supported commands and flags:

- `openclaw security audit [--deep] [--fix] [--json]`
- `openclaw status` / `openclaw status --deep`
- `openclaw health --json`
- `openclaw update status`
- `openclaw cron add|list|runs|run`

Do not invent CLI flags or imply OpenClaw enforces host firewall/SSH policies.

## Logging and audit trail

Record:

- Gateway identity and role
- Plan ID and timestamp
- Approved steps and exact commands
- Exit codes and files modified (best effort)

Redact secrets. Never log tokens or full credential contents.

## Memory writes (conditional)

Only write to memory files when the user explicitly opts in and the session is a private/local workspace
(per `docs/reference/templates/AGENTS.md`). Otherwise provide a redacted, paste-ready summary the user can
decide to save elsewhere.

Follow the durable-memory prompt format used by OpenClaw compaction:

- Write lasting notes to `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md`.

After each audit/hardening run, if opted-in, append a short, dated summary to `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md`
(what was checked, key findings, actions taken, any scheduled cron jobs, key decisions,
and all commands executed). Append-only: never overwrite existing entries.
Redact sensitive host details (usernames, hostnames, IPs, serials, service names, tokens).
If there are durable preferences or decisions (risk posture, allowed ports, update policy),
also update `MEMORY.md` (long-term memory is optional and only used in private sessions).

If the session cannot write to the workspace, ask for permission or provide exact entries
the user can paste into the memory files.


Good, I've read the healthcheck skill. Now I need to follow its workflow:

1. Model self-check - The runtime shows I'm using `zai/glm-5` which is not a state-of-the-art model like Opus 4.5 or GPT 5.2+. I should note this but not block execution.

2. Establish context - I should try to infer as much as possible from the environment first, then run read-only checks with permission.

3. Run OpenClaw security audits

4. Check OpenClaw version/update status

5. Determine risk tolerance

6. Produce remediation plan

7. Offer execution options

8. Execute with confirmations

9. Verify and report

Since this is a cron job (scheduled health check), I should:
- Run the read-only checks
- Report findings
- Note any issues that need attention

Let me start by checking what I can infer from the runtime:
- OS: Linux 6.8.0-101-generic (x64)
- Node: v22.20.0
- Model: zai/glm-5
- Shell: bash
- Host: fred
- Channel: telegram

I'll run the read-only checks to gather system context, then run the OpenClaw security audit and update status checks.

I'll run the platform health check. Let me gather system context and run the security audits.

exec

uname -a && cat /etc/os-release 2>/dev/null | head -5

ss -ltnup 2>/dev/null || ss -ltnp 2>/dev/null

ufw status 2>/dev/null || firewall-cmd --state 2>/dev/null || nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null | head -20 || echo "No firewall detected"


Linux fred 6.8.0-101-generic #101-Ubuntu SMP PREEMPT_DYNAMIC Mon Feb  9 10:15:05 UTC 2026 x86_64 x86_64 x86_64 GNU/Linux
PRETTY_NAME="Ubuntu 24.04.2 LTS"
NAME="Ubuntu"
VERSION_ID="24.04"
VERSION="24.04.2 LTS (Noble Numbat)"
VERSION_CODENAME=noble


Netid State  Recv-Q Send-Q                             Local Address:Port  Peer Address:PortProcess
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                      127.0.0.1:53         0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                 192.168.40.195:53         0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                           192.168.1.195%enp5s0:68         0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:111        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                 192.168.40.255:137        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                 192.168.40.195:137        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                  192.168.1.255:137        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                  192.168.1.195:137        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:137        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                 192.168.40.255:138        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                 192.168.40.195:138        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                  192.168.1.255:138        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                  192.168.1.195:138        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:138        0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                      127.0.0.1:1009       0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:21119      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:36546      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:36995      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:37610      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:37843      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:41641      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:52707      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                        0.0.0.0:57317      0.0.0.0:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                          [::1]:53            [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0      [fd97:a67d:27f0:15df:ffb0:945a:3fbb:ebc1]:53            [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0      [fd97:a67d:27f0:15df:3ad5:47ff:fec9:cd13]:53            [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0          [fe80::3ad5:47ff:fec9:cd13]%enp5s0.40:53            [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:111           [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:36927         [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:41641         [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:42603         [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:44139         [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                              *:51634            *:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:53148         [::]:*
udp   UNCONN 0      0                                           [::]:56133         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:58199      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      32                                192.168.40.195:53         0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:49447      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:54515      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                               100.98.154.42:3000       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                               100.98.154.42:443        0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      64                                       0.0.0.0:46807      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                               100.98.154.42:8090       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("pocketbase",pid=4063,fd=14))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                               100.98.154.42:8002       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                               100.98.154.42:5001       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:47989      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:47990      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:47984      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:48010      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:39655      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:25808      0.0.0.0:*    users:(("AionUi",pid=2668925,fd=60))
tcp   LISTEN 0      10                                     127.0.0.1:9222       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("chrome",pid=2668261,fd=76))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                   127.0.0.1:9883       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                               100.98.154.42:60698      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                   127.0.0.1:5037       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("adb",pid=11517,fd=9))
tcp   LISTEN 0      5                                        0.0.0.0:19900      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:18789      0.0.0.0:*    users:(("openclaw-gatewa",pid=1020519,fd=23))
tcp   LISTEN 0      32                                     127.0.0.1:53         0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                    127.0.0.1:1883       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                      0.0.0.0:10081      0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python3",pid=4000888,fd=8))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:9050       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                      0.0.0.0:8765       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      5                                        0.0.0.0:8766       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python3",pid=2330,fd=3))
tcp   LISTEN 0      5                                        0.0.0.0:8767       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      5                                        0.0.0.0:8770       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=3908417,fd=3))
tcp   LISTEN 0      128                                      0.0.0.0:8895       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python3",pid=3232,fd=3))
tcp   LISTEN 0      5                                        0.0.0.0:8888       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python3",pid=3818361,fd=3))
tcp   LISTEN 0      128                                      0.0.0.0:8889       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=3956,fd=6),("python",pid=3956,fd=5),("python",pid=3241,fd=5))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:8890       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("uvicorn",pid=3947,fd=15))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:8200       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("canonforge-serv",pid=3923,fd=31))
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                192.168.1.195:1883       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      50                                       0.0.0.0:445        0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                      0.0.0.0:25         0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:80         0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                     0.0.0.0:111        0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      50                                       0.0.0.0:139        0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:3333       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("node",pid=2369,fd=21))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:3004       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("next-server (v1",pid=4430,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      64                                       0.0.0.0:2049       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      128                                      0.0.0.0:2222       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                    127.0.0.1:18792      0.0.0.0:*    users:(("openclaw-gatewa",pid=1020519,fd=25))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:6093       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=3908860,fd=46))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:6094       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=3908862,fd=46))
tcp   LISTEN 0      128                                      0.0.0.0:6095       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=3908863,fd=6))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                    127.0.0.1:18791      0.0.0.0:*    users:(("openclaw-gatewa",pid=1020519,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      512                                      0.0.0.0:5812       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      512                                      0.0.0.0:5802       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:5174       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("node",pid=4168,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                   127.0.0.1:20241      0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:8004       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python3",pid=3940,fd=14))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:8005       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python3",pid=3908275,fd=59))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:8007       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("uvicorn",pid=3968,fd=15))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:8003       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=3387810,fd=50))
tcp   LISTEN 0      2048                                     0.0.0.0:8047       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("gunicorn",pid=3221,fd=5),("gunicorn",pid=2361,fd=5))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                      0.0.0.0:8080       0.0.0.0:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      128                                      0.0.0.0:8188       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=4068,fd=56))
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                      0.0.0.0:7777       0.0.0.0:*    users:(("python",pid=11576,fd=6))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                        [::]:57377         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                        [::]:52247         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      32     [fd97:a67d:27f0:15df:3ad5:47ff:fec9:cd13]:53            [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      32                                         [::1]:53            [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      100                                        [::1]:1883          [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      32     [fd97:a67d:27f0:15df:ffb0:945a:3fbb:ebc1]:53            [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                        [::]:45113         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                 [fd7a:115c:a1e0::3701:9a2c]:3000          [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      32         [fe80::3ad5:47ff:fec9:cd13]%enp5s0.40:53            [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      64                                          [::]:33257         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                        [::]:36153         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                 [fd7a:115c:a1e0::3701:9a2c]:443           [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                 [fd7a:115c:a1e0::3701:9a2c]:8002          [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                 [fd7a:115c:a1e0::3701:9a2c]:5001          [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                           *:9069             *:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:9070             *:*    users:(("node /home/crog",pid=3988,fd=37))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                 [fd7a:115c:a1e0::3701:9a2c]:48470         [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      50                                          [::]:445           [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                         [::]:80            [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                        [::]:111           [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      50                                          [::]:139           [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:3434             *:*    users:(("next-server (v1",pid=4411,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:3007             *:*    users:(("next-server (v1",pid=4401,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:3001             *:*    users:(("next-server (v1",pid=1297786,fd=21))
tcp   LISTEN 0      64                                          [::]:2049          [::]:*
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:5173             *:*    users:(("node",pid=3504,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:4600             *:*    users:(("next-server (v1",pid=3479,fd=22))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:4602             *:*    users:(("node",pid=3673,fd=48))
tcp   LISTEN 0      511                                            *:4141             *:*    users:(("node",pid=2283557,fd=24))
tcp   LISTEN 0      4096                                           *:8085             *:*    users:(("llamactl",pid=2352,fd=5))


(no output)


OpenClaw security audit
Summary: 8 critical · 7 warn · 2 info
Run deeper: openclaw security audit --deep

CRITICAL
gateway.control_ui.host_header_origin_fallback DANGEROUS: Host-header origin fallback enabled
  gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true enables Host-header origin fallback for Control UI/WebChat websocket checks and weakens DNS rebinding protections.
  Fix: Disable gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback and configure explicit gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins.
models.small_params Small models require sandboxing and web tools disabled
  Small models (<=300B params) detected:
- local/qwen3.5-35b-a3b (35B) @ agents.list.mark-twain.model.primary (unsafe; sandbox=off; web=[web_search, web_fetch, browser])
Uncontrolled input tools allowed: web_search, web_fetch, browser.
Small models are not recommended for untrusted inputs.
  Fix: If you must use small models, enable sandboxing for all sessions (agents.defaults.sandbox.mode="all") and disable web_search/web_fetch/browser (tools.deny=["group:web","browser"]).
security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled
  Found groupPolicy="open" at:
- channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.clinker.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.carl.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.canna.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.maya.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.grant.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.selena.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.ash.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.default.groupPolicy
With tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.
  Fix: Set groupPolicy="allowlist" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.
security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed
  Found groupPolicy="open" at:
- channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.clinker.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.carl.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.canna.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.maya.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.grant.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.selena.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.ash.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.default.groupPolicy
Risky tool exposure contexts:
- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.grant (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.maya (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.magoo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ghc-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cannadeals-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cardone (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.clinker (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.mark-twain (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.carl (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.selena (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ceo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ash (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
Prompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.
  Fix: For open groups, prefer tools.profile="messaging" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode="all" for exposed agents.
fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable Credentials dir is writable by others
  /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials mode=775; another user could drop/modify credential files.
  Fix: chmod 700 /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials
plugins.code_safety Plugin "foundry-openclaw" contains dangerous code patterns
  Found 3 critical issue(s) in 5 scanned file(s):
  - [dangerous-exec] Shell command execution detected (child_process) (index.ts:1700)
  - [dynamic-code-execution] Dynamic code execution detected (index.ts:1704)
  - [crypto-mining] Possible crypto-mining reference detected (index.ts:2629)
  Fix: Review the plugin source code carefully before use. If untrusted, remove the plugin from your OpenClaw extensions state directory.
plugins.code_safety Plugin "openclaw-better-gateway" contains dangerous code patterns
  Found 4 critical issue(s) in 23 scanned file(s):
  - [dynamic-code-execution] Dynamic code execution detected (src/ide-page.test.ts:26)
  - [dynamic-code-execution] Dynamic code execution detected (src/inject.test.ts:68)
  - [env-harvesting] Environment variable access combined with network send — possible credential harvesting (src/terminal-api.ts:236)
  - [env-harvesting] Environment variable access combined with network send — possible credential harvesting (dist/terminal-api.js:153)
  Fix: Review the plugin source code carefully before use. If untrusted, remove the plugin from your OpenClaw extensions state directory.
skills.code_safety Skill "reddit-poster" contains dangerous code patterns
  Found 2 critical issue(s) in 5 scanned file(s) under /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/agents/cannadeals-marketing/skills/reddit-poster:
  - [env-harvesting] Environment variable access combined with network send — possible credential harvesting (scripts/redditCommenter.ts:7)
  - [env-harvesting] Environment variable access combined with network send — possible credential harvesting (scripts/socialManager.ts:8)
  Fix: Review the skill source code before use. If untrusted, remove "/home/crogers2287/.openclaw/agents/cannadeals-marketing/skills/reddit-poster".

WARN
config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags Insecure or dangerous config flags enabled
  Detected 1 enabled flag(s): gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true.
  Fix: Disable these flags when not actively debugging, or keep deployment scoped to trusted/local-only networks.
gateway.auth_no_rate_limit No auth rate limiting configured
  gateway.bind is not loopback but no gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured. Without rate limiting, brute-force auth attacks are not mitigated.
  Fix: Set gateway.auth.rateLimit (e.g. { maxAttempts: 10, windowMs: 60000, lockoutMs: 300000 }).
config.secrets.gateway_password_in_config Gateway password is stored in config
  gateway.auth.password is set in the config file; prefer environment variables for secrets when possible.
  Fix: Prefer OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD (env) and remove gateway.auth.password from disk.
security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)
  Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:
- channels.telegram.groupPolicy="allowlist" with configured group targets
- channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.clinker.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.carl.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.canna.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.maya.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.grant.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.selena.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.ash.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.default.groupPolicy="open"
Runtime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.
Potential high-impact tool exposure contexts:
- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.grant (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.maya (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.magoo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ghc-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cannadeals-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cardone (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.clinker (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.mark-twain (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.carl (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.selena (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ceo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ash (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
OpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.
  Fix: If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode="all", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.
plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy Extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy
  Enabled extension plugins: email, openclaw-better-gateway.
Permissive tool policy contexts:
- default
- agents.list.grant
- agents.list.maya
- agents.list.magoo
- agents.list.ghc-marketing
- agents.list.cannadeals-marketing
- agents.list.cardone
- agents.list.clinker
- agents.list.mark-twain
- agents.list.carl
- agents.list.selena
- agents.list.ceo
- agents.list.ash
  Fix: Use restrictive profiles (`minimal`/`coding`) or explicit tool allowlists that exclude plugin tools for agents handling untrusted input.
plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs Plugin installs include unpinned npm specs
  Unpinned plugin install records:
- foundry-openclaw (@getfoundry/foundry-openclaw)
  Fix: Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/pkg@1.2.3`) for higher supply-chain stability.
plugins.installs_missing_integrity Plugin installs are missing integrity metadata
  Plugin install records missing integrity:
- foundry-openclaw
  Fix: Reinstall or update plugins to refresh install metadata with resolved integrity hashes.

INFO
summary.attack_surface Attack surface summary
  groups: open=0, allowlist=1
tools.elevated: enabled
hooks.webhooks: disabled
hooks.internal: enabled
browser control: enabled
trust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway
gateway.http.session_key_override_enabled HTTP API session-key override is enabled
  /v1/chat/completions accept x-openclaw-session-key for per-request session routing. Treat API credential holders as trusted principals.


OpenClaw update status

┌──────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Item     │ Value                                                                                │
├──────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Install  │ pnpm                                                                                │
│ Channel  │ stable (default)                                                                                │
│ Update   │ available · pnpm · npm update 2026.3.2                                                                   │
└──────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Update available (npm 2026.3.2). Run: openclaw update


Good, I have all the data I need. Let me compile this into a health check summary:

**System Context:**
- Host: fred (Linux Ubuntu 24.04.2 LTS)
- Kernel: 6.8.0-101-generic
- Node: v22.20.0
- Model: zai/glm-5 (below state-of-the-art threshold - should note)

**OpenClaw Security Audit:**
- 8 critical issues
- 7 warnings
- 2 info

**Critical Issues:**
1. Host-header origin fallback enabled (weakens DNS rebinding protection)
2. Small model (qwen3.5-35b-a3b) with web tools enabled without sandbox
3. Open group policies with elevated tools enabled
4. Open group policies with runtime/filesystem tools exposed
5. Credentials dir is writable by others (mode 775)
6. Plugin "foundry-openclaw" has dangerous code patterns
7. Plugin "openclaw-better-gateway" has dangerous code patterns
8. Skill "reddit-poster" has dangerous code patterns

**Warnings:**
1. Insecure config flags enabled
2. No auth rate limiting
3. Gateway password in config (not env)
4. Multi-user heuristic detected
5. Plugin tools reachable under permissive policy
6. Unpinned npm specs for plugins
7. Plugin installs missing integrity metadata

**Update Status:**
- Update available: npm 2026.3.2
- Current channel: stable

**Firewall Status:**
- No output from ufw, firewall-cmd, or nft - seems no active firewall detected

**Listening Ports:**
- Many services exposed (OpenClaw gateway on 18789, multiple node/python processes, SMB, HTTP, etc.)

This is a summary for the cron job, so I'll present the findings clearly.

## Platform Health Check — March 7, 2026 (08:30 UTC)

**Host:** fred (Ubuntu 24.04.2 LTS, Kernel 6.8.0-101-generic)
**OpenClaw Channel:** stable
**Update Available:** Yes — npm 2026.3.2

---

### Security Audit Summary

| Severity | Count |
|----------|-------|
| Critical | 8 |
| Warning | 7 |
| Info | 2 |

---

### Critical Issues

1. **Host-header origin fallback enabled** — `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true` weakens DNS rebinding protection. Fix: Disable and configure explicit `allowedOrigins`.

2. **Small model with web tools unsandboxed** — `local/qwen3.5-35b-a3b` has `web_search`, `web_fetch`, `browser` enabled without sandbox. Fix: Enable sandboxing and restrict web tools.

3. **Open group policy with elevated tools** — 10 Telegram accounts use `groupPolicy="open"` with elevated tools enabled. Risk: prompt injection → high-impact actions. Fix: Set `groupPolicy="allowlist"`.

4. **Open group policy with runtime/fs tools** — Same 10 accounts expose `exec`, `process`, `read`, `write`, `edit` without sandbox. Fix: Restrict tools or enable sandboxing.

5. **Credentials dir writable by others** — `/home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials` mode 775. Fix: `chmod 700`.

6. **Plugin "foundry-openclaw" dangerous patterns** — Shell exec, dynamic code exec, possible crypto-mining reference detected. Review before use.

7. **Plugin "openclaw-better-gateway" dangerous patterns** — Dynamic code exec, possible env harvesting. Review before use.

8. **Skill "reddit-poster" dangerous patterns** — Env harvesting detected. Review before use.

---

### Warnings

- Insecure config flag: `dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true`
- No auth rate limiting configured (brute-force not mitigated)
- Gateway password stored in config, not env var
- Multi-user heuristic detected with runtime tools exposed
- Plugin tools reachable under permissive policy
- Unpinned npm specs for `foundry-openclaw`
- Plugin installs missing integrity hashes

---

### Network Exposure

- **Firewall:** Not detected (ufw/firewalld/nft not active)
- **Open Ports:** HTTP (80), SMB (445/139), SSH (2222), OpenClaw Gateway (18789/18791/18792), multiple dev servers (3001, 3004, 3333, 5173-5174, 8003-8007, 8080, 8188, 8765-8770, etc.)
- Many services bound to `0.0.0.0` (public-facing) and Tailscale IPs

---

### Recommended Actions

1. `chmod 700 ~/.openclaw/credentials`
2. Set `groupPolicy="allowlist"` for Telegram accounts
3. Enable sandboxing for small models or disable web tools
4. Disable `dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback`
5. Set `gateway.auth.rateLimit` to mitigate brute-force
6. Move gateway password to `OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD` env var
7. Review/review plugins: `foundry-openclaw`, `openclaw-better-gateway`
8. Review skill: `reddit-poster`
9. Run `openclaw update` to get npm 2026.3.2

---

**Note:** Model `zai/glm-5` is below recommended SOTA level for security audits. For detailed remediation, consider re-running with a stronger model (Opus 4.5 / GPT 5.2+).

To fix issues, run `openclaw security audit --fix` (OpenClaw-level only) or invoke `healthcheck` skill for guided remediation.