type: custom

customType: model-snapshot

provider: zai

modelApi: openai-completions


type: message

role: user

type: text

text:
[cron:d6762c54-737b-465f-9bbe-bc3fd5474dff Platform Health Council — Daily Check] Run platform health check
Current time: Friday, February 27th, 2026 — 8:30 AM (UTC)

Return your summary as plain text; it will be delivered automatically. If the task explicitly calls for messaging a specific external recipient, note who/where it should go instead of sending it yourself.


role: assistant

type: thinking

thinking:
The user is asking me to run a platform health check. This is a cron job triggered task. Let me check what I need to do:

1. First, I should read the healthcheck skill to understand what a platform health check involves
2. According to the skills list, the "healthcheck" skill is for "Host security hardening and risk-tolerance configuration for OpenClaw deployments"

Let me read the healthcheck skill to understand what I need to do.

read

type: toolCall

api: openai-completions

stopReason: toolUse


role: toolResult

toolName: read

text:
---
name: healthcheck
description: Host security hardening and risk-tolerance configuration for OpenClaw deployments. Use when a user asks for security audits, firewall/SSH/update hardening, risk posture, exposure review, OpenClaw cron scheduling for periodic checks, or version status checks on a machine running OpenClaw (laptop, workstation, Pi, VPS).
---

# OpenClaw Host Hardening

## Overview

Assess and harden the host running OpenClaw, then align it to a user-defined risk tolerance without breaking access. Use OpenClaw security tooling as a first-class signal, but treat OS hardening as a separate, explicit set of steps.

## Core rules

- Recommend running this skill with a state-of-the-art model (e.g., Opus 4.5, GPT 5.2+). The agent should self-check the current model and suggest switching if below that level; do not block execution.
- Require explicit approval before any state-changing action.
- Do not modify remote access settings without confirming how the user connects.
- Prefer reversible, staged changes with a rollback plan.
- Never claim OpenClaw changes the host firewall, SSH, or OS updates; it does not.
- If role/identity is unknown, provide recommendations only.
- Formatting: every set of user choices must be numbered so the user can reply with a single digit.
- System-level backups are recommended; try to verify status.

## Workflow (follow in order)

### 0) Model self-check (non-blocking)

Before starting, check the current model. If it is below state-of-the-art (e.g., Opus 4.5, GPT 5.2+), recommend switching. Do not block execution.

### 1) Establish context (read-only)

Try to infer 1–5 from the environment before asking. Prefer simple, non-technical questions if you need confirmation.

Determine (in order):

1. OS and version (Linux/macOS/Windows), container vs host.
2. Privilege level (root/admin vs user).
3. Access path (local console, SSH, RDP, tailnet).
4. Network exposure (public IP, reverse proxy, tunnel).
5. OpenClaw gateway status and bind address.
6. Backup system and status (e.g., Time Machine, system images, snapshots).
7. Deployment context (local mac app, headless gateway host, remote gateway, container/CI).
8. Disk encryption status (FileVault/LUKS/BitLocker).
9. OS automatic security updates status.
   Note: these are not blocking items, but are highly recommended, especially if OpenClaw can access sensitive data.
10. Usage mode for a personal assistant with full access (local workstation vs headless/remote vs other).

First ask once for permission to run read-only checks. If granted, run them by default and only ask questions for items you cannot infer or verify. Do not ask for information already visible in runtime or command output. Keep the permission ask as a single sentence, and list follow-up info needed as an unordered list (not numbered) unless you are presenting selectable choices.

If you must ask, use non-technical prompts:

- “Are you using a Mac, Windows PC, or Linux?”
- “Are you logged in directly on the machine, or connecting from another computer?”
- “Is this machine reachable from the public internet, or only on your home/network?”
- “Do you have backups enabled (e.g., Time Machine), and are they current?”
- “Is disk encryption turned on (FileVault/BitLocker/LUKS)?”
- “Are automatic security updates enabled?”
- “How do you use this machine?”
  Examples:
  - Personal machine shared with the assistant
  - Dedicated local machine for the assistant
  - Dedicated remote machine/server accessed remotely (always on)
  - Something else?

Only ask for the risk profile after system context is known.

If the user grants read-only permission, run the OS-appropriate checks by default. If not, offer them (numbered). Examples:

1. OS: `uname -a`, `sw_vers`, `cat /etc/os-release`.
2. Listening ports:
   - Linux: `ss -ltnup` (or `ss -ltnp` if `-u` unsupported).
   - macOS: `lsof -nP -iTCP -sTCP:LISTEN`.
3. Firewall status:
   - Linux: `ufw status`, `firewall-cmd --state`, `nft list ruleset` (pick what is installed).
   - macOS: `/usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate` and `pfctl -s info`.
4. Backups (macOS): `tmutil status` (if Time Machine is used).

### 2) Run OpenClaw security audits (read-only)

As part of the default read-only checks, run `openclaw security audit --deep`. Only offer alternatives if the user requests them:

1. `openclaw security audit` (faster, non-probing)
2. `openclaw security audit --json` (structured output)

Offer to apply OpenClaw safe defaults (numbered):

1. `openclaw security audit --fix`

Be explicit that `--fix` only tightens OpenClaw defaults and file permissions. It does not change host firewall, SSH, or OS update policies.

If browser control is enabled, recommend that 2FA be enabled on all important accounts, with hardware keys preferred and SMS not sufficient.

### 3) Check OpenClaw version/update status (read-only)

As part of the default read-only checks, run `openclaw update status`.

Report the current channel and whether an update is available.

### 4) Determine risk tolerance (after system context)

Ask the user to pick or confirm a risk posture and any required open services/ports (numbered choices below).
Do not pigeonhole into fixed profiles; if the user prefers, capture requirements instead of choosing a profile.
Offer suggested profiles as optional defaults (numbered). Note that most users pick Home/Workstation Balanced:

1. Home/Workstation Balanced (most common): firewall on with reasonable defaults, remote access restricted to LAN or tailnet.
2. VPS Hardened: deny-by-default inbound firewall, minimal open ports, key-only SSH, no root login, automatic security updates.
3. Developer Convenience: more local services allowed, explicit exposure warnings, still audited.
4. Custom: user-defined constraints (services, exposure, update cadence, access methods).

### 5) Produce a remediation plan

Provide a plan that includes:

- Target profile
- Current posture summary
- Gaps vs target
- Step-by-step remediation with exact commands
- Access-preservation strategy and rollback
- Risks and potential lockout scenarios
- Least-privilege notes (e.g., avoid admin usage, tighten ownership/permissions where safe)
- Credential hygiene notes (location of OpenClaw creds, prefer disk encryption)

Always show the plan before any changes.

### 6) Offer execution options

Offer one of these choices (numbered so users can reply with a single digit):

1. Do it for me (guided, step-by-step approvals)
2. Show plan only
3. Fix only critical issues
4. Export commands for later

### 7) Execute with confirmations

For each step:

- Show the exact command
- Explain impact and rollback
- Confirm access will remain available
- Stop on unexpected output and ask for guidance

### 8) Verify and report

Re-check:

- Firewall status
- Listening ports
- Remote access still works
- OpenClaw security audit (re-run)

Deliver a final posture report and note any deferred items.

## Required confirmations (always)

Require explicit approval for:

- Firewall rule changes
- Opening/closing ports
- SSH/RDP configuration changes
- Installing/removing packages
- Enabling/disabling services
- User/group modifications
- Scheduling tasks or startup persistence
- Update policy changes
- Access to sensitive files or credentials

If unsure, ask.

## Periodic checks

After OpenClaw install or first hardening pass, run at least one baseline audit and version check:

- `openclaw security audit`
- `openclaw security audit --deep`
- `openclaw update status`

Ongoing monitoring is recommended. Use the OpenClaw cron tool/CLI to schedule periodic audits (Gateway scheduler). Do not create scheduled tasks without explicit approval. Store outputs in a user-approved location and avoid secrets in logs.
When scheduling headless cron runs, include a note in the output that instructs the user to call `healthcheck` so issues can be fixed.

### Required prompt to schedule (always)

After any audit or hardening pass, explicitly offer scheduling and require a direct response. Use a short prompt like (numbered):

1. “Do you want me to schedule periodic audits (e.g., daily/weekly) via `openclaw cron add`?”

If the user says yes, ask for:

- cadence (daily/weekly), preferred time window, and output location
- whether to also schedule `openclaw update status`

Use a stable cron job name so updates are deterministic. Prefer exact names:

- `healthcheck:security-audit`
- `healthcheck:update-status`

Before creating, `openclaw cron list` and match on exact `name`. If found, `openclaw cron edit <id> ...`.
If not found, `openclaw cron add --name <name> ...`.

Also offer a periodic version check so the user can decide when to update (numbered):

1. `openclaw update status` (preferred for source checkouts and channels)
2. `npm view openclaw version` (published npm version)

## OpenClaw command accuracy

Use only supported commands and flags:

- `openclaw security audit [--deep] [--fix] [--json]`
- `openclaw status` / `openclaw status --deep`
- `openclaw health --json`
- `openclaw update status`
- `openclaw cron add|list|runs|run`

Do not invent CLI flags or imply OpenClaw enforces host firewall/SSH policies.

## Logging and audit trail

Record:

- Gateway identity and role
- Plan ID and timestamp
- Approved steps and exact commands
- Exit codes and files modified (best effort)

Redact secrets. Never log tokens or full credential contents.

## Memory writes (conditional)

Only write to memory files when the user explicitly opts in and the session is a private/local workspace
(per `docs/reference/templates/AGENTS.md`). Otherwise provide a redacted, paste-ready summary the user can
decide to save elsewhere.

Follow the durable-memory prompt format used by OpenClaw compaction:

- Write lasting notes to `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md`.

After each audit/hardening run, if opted-in, append a short, dated summary to `memory/YYYY-MM-DD.md`
(what was checked, key findings, actions taken, any scheduled cron jobs, key decisions,
and all commands executed). Append-only: never overwrite existing entries.
Redact sensitive host details (usernames, hostnames, IPs, serials, service names, tokens).
If there are durable preferences or decisions (risk posture, allowed ports, update policy),
also update `MEMORY.md` (long-term memory is optional and only used in private sessions).

If the session cannot write to the workspace, ask for permission or provide exact entries
the user can paste into the memory files.


thinking:
Okay, so I need to run a platform health check. According to the skill:

1. Model self-check (non-blocking) - I'm running on zai/glm-5 which is not Opus 4.5/GPT 5.2+, so I should note this
2. Run OpenClaw security audits - `openclaw security audit --deep`
3. Check OpenClaw version/update status - `openclaw update status`

Since this is a cron job, I should run read-only checks by default (the cron is triggering this, so implicit permission to run checks). Let me run the security audit and update status checks.

exec

command: openclaw security audit --deep

command: openclaw update status

command: openclaw status


toolName: exec

text:
OpenClaw security audit
Summary: 6 critical · 7 warn · 2 info
Run deeper: openclaw security audit --deep

CRITICAL
gateway.control_ui.host_header_origin_fallback DANGEROUS: Host-header origin fallback enabled
  gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true enables Host-header origin fallback for Control UI/WebChat websocket checks and weakens DNS rebinding protections.
  Fix: Disable gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback and configure explicit gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins.
security.exposure.open_groups_with_elevated Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled
  Found groupPolicy="open" at:
- channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.clinker.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.carl.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.canna.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.maya.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.grant.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.selena.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.ash.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.default.groupPolicy
With tools.elevated enabled, a prompt injection in those rooms can become a high-impact incident.
  Fix: Set groupPolicy="allowlist" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.
security.exposure.open_groups_with_runtime_or_fs Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed
  Found groupPolicy="open" at:
- channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.clinker.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.carl.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.canna.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.maya.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.grant.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.selena.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.ash.groupPolicy
- channels.telegram.accounts.default.groupPolicy
Risky tool exposure contexts:
- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.grant (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.maya (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.magoo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ghc-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cannadeals-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cardone (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.clinker (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.mark-twain (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.carl (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.selena (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ceo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ash (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
Prompt injection in open groups can trigger command/file actions in these contexts.
  Fix: For open groups, prefer tools.profile="messaging" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode="all" for exposed agents.
fs.credentials_dir.perms_writable Credentials dir is writable by others
  /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials mode=775; another user could drop/modify credential files.
  Fix: chmod 700 /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials
plugins.code_safety Plugin "foundry-openclaw" contains dangerous code patterns
  Found 3 critical issue(s) in 5 scanned file(s):
  - [dangerous-exec] Shell command execution detected (child_process) (index.ts:1700)
  - [dynamic-code-execution] Dynamic code execution detected (index.ts:1704)
  - [crypto-mining] Possible crypto-mining reference detected (index.ts:2629)
  Fix: Review the plugin source code carefully before use. If untrusted, remove the plugin from your OpenClaw extensions state directory.
skills.code_safety Skill "reddit-poster" contains dangerous code patterns
  Found 2 critical issue(s) in 5 scanned file(s) under /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/agents/cannadeals-marketing/skills/reddit-poster:
  - [env-harvesting] Environment variable access combined with network send — possible credential harvesting (scripts/redditCommenter.ts:7)
  - [env-harvesting] Environment variable access combined with network send — possible credential harvesting (scripts/socialManager.ts:8)
  Fix: Review the skill source code before use. If untrusted, remove "/home/crogers2287/.openclaw/agents/cannadeals-marketing/skills/reddit-poster".

WARN
config.insecure_or_dangerous_flags Insecure or dangerous config flags enabled
  Detected 1 enabled flag(s): gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true.
  Fix: Disable these flags when not actively debugging, or keep deployment scoped to trusted/local-only networks.
gateway.auth_no_rate_limit No auth rate limiting configured
  gateway.bind is not loopback but no gateway.auth.rateLimit is configured. Without rate limiting, brute-force auth attacks are not mitigated.
  Fix: Set gateway.auth.rateLimit (e.g. { maxAttempts: 10, windowMs: 60000, lockoutMs: 300000 }).
config.secrets.gateway_password_in_config Gateway password is stored in config
  gateway.auth.password is set in the config file; prefer environment variables for secrets when possible.
  Fix: Prefer OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD (env) and remove gateway.auth.password from disk.
security.trust_model.multi_user_heuristic Potential multi-user setup detected (personal-assistant model warning)
  Heuristic signals indicate this gateway may be reachable by multiple users:
- channels.telegram.groupPolicy="allowlist" with configured group targets
- channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.clinker.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.carl.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.canna.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.maya.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.grant.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.selena.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.ash.groupPolicy="open"
- channels.telegram.accounts.default.groupPolicy="open"
Runtime/process tools are exposed without full sandboxing in at least one context.
Potential high-impact tool exposure contexts:
- agents.defaults (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.grant (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.maya (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.magoo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ghc-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cannadeals-marketing (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.cardone (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.clinker (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.mark-twain (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.carl (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.selena (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ceo (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
- agents.list.ash (sandbox=off; runtime=[exec, process]; fs=[read, write, edit, apply_patch]; fs.workspaceOnly=false)
OpenClaw's default security model is personal-assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant isolation on one shared gateway.
  Fix: If users may be mutually untrusted, split trust boundaries (separate gateways + credentials, ideally separate OS users/hosts). If you intentionally run shared-user access, set agents.defaults.sandbox.mode="all", keep tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, deny runtime/fs/web tools unless required, and keep personal/private identities + credentials off that runtime.
plugins.tools_reachable_permissive_policy Extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy
  Enabled extension plugins: email.
Permissive tool policy contexts:
- default
- agents.list.grant
- agents.list.maya
- agents.list.magoo
- agents.list.ghc-marketing
- agents.list.cannadeals-marketing
- agents.list.cardone
- agents.list.clinker
- agents.list.mark-twain
- agents.list.carl
- agents.list.selena
- agents.list.ceo
- agents.list.ash
  Fix: Use restrictive profiles (`minimal`/`coding`) or explicit tool allowlists that exclude plugin tools for agents handling untrusted input.
plugins.installs_unpinned_npm_specs Plugin installs include unpinned npm specs
  Unpinned plugin install records:
- foundry-openclaw (@getfoundry/foundry-openclaw)
  Fix: Pin install specs to exact versions (for example, `@scope/pkg@1.2.3`) for higher supply-chain stability.
plugins.installs_missing_integrity Plugin installs are missing integrity metadata
  Plugin install records missing integrity:
- foundry-openclaw
  Fix: Reinstall or update plugins to refresh install metadata with resolved integrity hashes.

INFO
summary.attack_surface Attack surface summary
  groups: open=0, allowlist=1
tools.elevated: enabled
hooks.webhooks: disabled
hooks.internal: enabled
browser control: enabled
trust model: personal assistant (one trusted operator boundary), not hostile multi-tenant on one shared gateway
gateway.http.session_key_override_enabled HTTP API session-key override is enabled
  /v1/chat/completions accept x-openclaw-session-key for per-request session routing. Treat API credential holders as trusted principals.

status: completed


text:
OpenClaw update status

┌──────────┬──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Item     │ Value                                                                                │
├──────────┼──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Install  │ pnpm                                                                                │
│ Channel  │ stable (default)                                                                                │
│ Update   │ pnpm · npm latest 2026.2.26                                                                              │
└──────────┴──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘


text:
[plugins] email: loaded without install/load-path provenance; treat as untracked local code and pin trust via plugins.allow or install records (/home/crogers2287/.openclaw/extensions/email/index.ts)
OpenClaw status

Overview
┌─────────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Item            │ Value                                                                                │
├─────────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Dashboard       │ http://192.168.1.195:18789/                                                                       │
│ OS              │ linux 6.8.0-100-generic (x64) · node 22.20.0                                                      │
│ Tailscale       │ off                                                                                │
│ Channel         │ stable (default)                                                                                │
│ Update          │ pnpm · npm latest 2026.2.26                                                                       │
│ Gateway         │ local · ws://127.0.0.1:18789 (local loopback) · reachable 24ms · auth token+password · fred (192. │
│                 │ 168.1.195) app 2026.2.17 linux 6.8.0-100-generic                                                  │
│ Gateway service │ systemd installed · enabled · running (pid 143546, state active)                                  │
│ Node service    │ systemd not installed                                                                             │
│ Agents          │ 12 · 1 bootstrap file present · sessions 268 · default grant active just now                      │
│ Memory          │ 473 files · 473 chunks · sources memory · plugin memory-core · vector ready                       │
│ Probes          │ skipped (use --deep)                                                                              │
│ Events          │ none                                                                                │
│ Heartbeat       │ 1h (grant), disabled (ash), disabled (cannadeals-marketing), disabled (cardone), disabled         │
│                 │ (carl), disabled (ceo), disabled (clinker), disabled (ghc-marketing), disabled (magoo), disabled  │
│                 │ (mark-twain), 4h (maya), disabled (selena)                                                        │
│ Sessions        │ 268 active · default glm-5 (205k ctx) · 12 stores                                                 │
└─────────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Security audit
Summary: 14 critical · 8 warn · 2 info
  CRITICAL DANGEROUS: Host-header origin fallback enabled
    gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback=true enables Host-header origin fallback for Control UI/WebChat websocket checks and weakens DNS reb…
    Fix: Disable gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback and configure explicit gateway.controlUi.allowedOrigins.
  CRITICAL Open groupPolicy with elevated tools enabled
    Found groupPolicy="open" at: - channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy - channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy - channels.telegram.accounts.clinker…
    Fix: Set groupPolicy="allowlist" and keep elevated allowlists extremely tight.
  CRITICAL Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed
    Found groupPolicy="open" at: - channels.telegram.accounts.magoo.groupPolicy - channels.telegram.accounts.twain.groupPolicy - channels.telegram.accounts.clinker…
    Fix: For open groups, prefer tools.profile="messaging" (or deny group:runtime/group:fs), set tools.fs.workspaceOnly=true, and use agents.defaults.sandbox.mode="all" for exposed agents.
  CRITICAL Credentials dir is writable by others
    /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials mode=775; another user could drop/modify credential files.
    Fix: chmod 700 /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials
  CRITICAL Telegram security warning
    Telegram groups: groupPolicy="open" allows any member in allowed groups to trigger (mention-gated). Set channels.telegram.groupPolicy="allowlist" + channels.te…
  CRITICAL Telegram group commands have no sender allowlist
    Telegram group access is enabled but no sender allowlist is configured; this allows any group member to invoke /… commands (including skill commands).
    Fix: Approve yourself via pairing (recommended), or set channels.telegram.groupAllowFrom (or per-group groups.<id>.allowFrom).
… +16 more
Full report: openclaw security audit
Deep probe: openclaw security audit --deep

Channels
┌──────────┬─────────┬────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Channel  │ Enabled │ State  │ Detail                                                                                │
├──────────┼─────────┼────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ Telegram │ ON      │ WARN   │ token config×9 (8343…oLYQ · len 46) · accounts 9/11 · gateway: Config allows          │
│          │         │        │ unmentioned group messages (requireMention=false). Telegram Bot API p…                │
│ Email    │ ON      │ OK     │ configured                                                                            │
└──────────┴─────────┴────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Sessions
┌──────────────────────────────────────────┬────────┬──────────┬───────────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┐
│ Key                                      │ Kind   │ Age      │ Model             │ Tokens                           │
├──────────────────────────────────────────┼────────┼──────────┼───────────────────┼──────────────────────────────────┤
│ agent:grant:main                         │ direct │ just now │ claude-sonnet-4-5 │ 55k/200k (28%) · 🗄 132% cached  │
│ agent:magoo:cron:d6762c54-737b-…         │ direct │ 1m ago   │ glm-5             │ 11k/205k (5%)                    │
│ agent:magoo:cron:d6762c54-737b-…         │ direct │ 1m ago   │ glm-5             │ 11k/205k (5%)                    │
│ agent:ghc-marketing:cron:da3214…         │ direct │ 57m ago  │ glm-5             │ 17k/205k (8%) · 🗄 455% cached   │
│ agent:ghc-marketing:cron:da3214…         │ direct │ 57m ago  │ glm-5             │ 17k/205k (8%) · 🗄 455% cached   │
│ agent:cannadeals-marketing:main          │ direct │ 57m ago  │ glm-5             │ 129k/205k (63%) · 🗄 7% cached   │
│ agent:maya:main                          │ direct │ 59m ago  │ glm-5             │ 17k/205k (8%) · 🗄 199% cached   │
│ agent:cannadeals-marketing:cron…         │ direct │ 1h ago   │ glm-5             │ 22k/205k (11%) · 🗄 1021% cached │
│ agent:cannadeals-marketing:cron…         │ direct │ 1h ago   │ glm-5             │ 22k/205k (11%) · 🗄 1021% cached │
│ agent:grant:cron:c3c57f0a-3bfc-…         │ direct │ 1h ago   │ glm-5             │ 16k/205k (8%) · 🗄 687% cached   │
└──────────────────────────────────────────┴────────┴──────────┴───────────────────┴──────────────────────────────────┘

FAQ: https://docs.openclaw.ai/faq
Troubleshooting: https://docs.openclaw.ai/troubleshooting

Next steps:
  Need to share?      openclaw status --all
  Need to debug live? openclaw logs --follow
  Need to test channels? openclaw status --deep


thinking:
I have the security audit results and status. Let me compile a summary of the platform health check:

**Key Findings:**
1. 6 critical, 7 warn, 2 info from security audit
2. Update available: npm latest 2026.2.26 (current: 2026.2.17)
3. Gateway running, systemd service active

**Critical Issues:**
1. Host-header origin fallback enabled (dangerous)
2. Open groupPolicy with elevated tools - 10 Telegram accounts have open group policy with elevated tools
3. Open groupPolicy with runtime/filesystem tools exposed
4. Credentials dir writable by others (mode 775)
5. Plugin "foundry-openclaw" has dangerous code patterns
6. Skill "reddit-poster" has dangerous code patterns

**Warnings:**
1. Insecure/dangerous config flags enabled
2. No auth rate limiting
3. Gateway password in config file
4. Multi-user heuristic detected
5. Plugin tools reachable under permissive policy
6. Unpinned npm specs for plugins
7. Missing integrity metadata for plugins

The user asked for plain text summary that will be delivered automatically. I should provide a concise health check summary.

text:
**Platform Health Check — Feb 27, 2026 08:30 UTC**

**Overall Status: ⚠ NEEDS ATTENTION**

---

**OpenClaw Version:**
- Current: 2026.2.17 (stable channel)
- Update available: 2026.2.26
- Recommend: `openclaw update` at your convenience

---

**Security Audit Summary:**
- 6 CRITICAL issues
- 7 WARNINGS
- 2 INFO items

**Critical Issues Requiring Action:**

1. **Host-header origin fallback enabled** — Weakens DNS rebinding protections
   - Fix: Disable `gateway.controlUi.dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback`

2. **Open groupPolicy with elevated tools** — 10 Telegram accounts allow open groups with elevated tools
   - Fix: Set `groupPolicy="allowlist"` for all accounts

3. **Credentials directory permissions** — `/home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials` is mode 775
   - Fix: `chmod 700 /home/crogers2287/.openclaw/credentials`

4. **Plugin safety concerns:**
   - `foundry-openclaw` plugin has dangerous code patterns (exec, dynamic code, crypto-mining refs)
   - `reddit-poster` skill has credential harvesting patterns
   - Fix: Review or remove these extensions

---

**Gateway Status:**
- Running: ✅ (pid 143546, systemd active)
- Dashboard: http://192.168.1.195:18789/
- 12 agents, 268 sessions
- Memory: 473 files indexed

---

**Recommended Actions:**

1. Run `openclaw update` to get latest version
2. Fix credentials permissions: `chmod 700 ~/.openclaw/credentials`
3. Review `foundry-openclaw` plugin and `reddit-poster` skill
4. Consider setting `groupPolicy="allowlist"` for Telegram accounts
5. Review and disable `dangerouslyAllowHostHeaderOriginFallback`

---

For interactive hardening, run: `openclaw security audit --fix` (OpenClaw-level fixes only) or call the healthcheck skill for guided remediation.

stopReason: stop